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Abstract 
Passive systems noticeably those which are capable of transferring thermal power from a heat source to a 
sink without the use of energy which is not coming from gravity are in use of nuclear technology since the 
pioneering design of reactors. They received a step-wise, fashion-type, renewed interest following the 
three major nuclear accidents in 1979, 1986 and 2011. The words thermal-hydraulic passive systems, 
design and safety, open to a myriad of research and application activities, which without surprise may 
appear contradictory and, at least, not converging into a common understanding. In the present paper an 
attempt is made to use the word reliability in order to select a space in the design and safety assessment 
and to derive agreeable outcomes for the technology of passive systems. The key conclusions are: (a) 
passive systems are not the panacea for protecting the core of nuclear reactors in each foreseeable 
accident condition; (b) specific licensing rules are strictly needed and not yet formulated; (c) reliability of 
operation, once a target mission is assigned, may reveal not unit; (d) systems implying the use of active 
components like pumps shall not be avoided in future designed/built nuclear reactors.           
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Passive systems are embedded into the nuclear reactor technology design and safety since the beginning of 
the ‘nuclear’ era. In relation to design, the layout of primary systems of both Pressurized Water Reactor 
(PWR) and Boiling Water Reactors (BWR) is fixed based on natural circulation: the mutual positions of core 
and steam generators in the case of PWR and the elevation of the feedwater nozzle in the BWR vessel are 
designed to ensure (at least) removal of decay heat when active systems – noticeably, centrifugal pumps – 
are not available. In relation to safety, accumulators are one example of vital passive systems strictly 
needed to mitigate consequences of Large Break Loss of Coolant Accidents (LB-LOCA). 
Here it seems worthwhile to note that any safety system, either active or passive, added to an already 
complex nuclear reactor designed to produce electrical power may introduce triggering causes for 
accidents and may interact with other existing system during the progression and eventually the mitigation 
of the accident. 
Immediately after the Chernobyl accident in 1986, the passive systems received renowned attention by 
industry and scientists, noticeably and primarily in those Countries where that event had significant impact 
upon the exploitation of fission reaction for energy production. In other terms passive systems were taken 
as a remedy to unforeseeable situations, i.e. capable of mitigating or even avoiding the progression of 
accidents. The designs of Simplified Boiling Water Reactor (SBWR) and of the Advanced PWR (AP-600 and, 
more recently, AP-1000) were significant outcomes. The Fukushima accident in 2011 reinforced, in this case 
in all Countries, the interest towards passive systems, although those systems, ultimately, did not prove 
their effectiveness during the concerned event. 
One may add at this point that the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 shifted the attention of nuclear safety 
analysists from LB-LOCA to Small Break LOCA (SB-LOCA), i.e. accident scenarios dominated by natural 
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circulation which constitutes a key phenomenon at the basis of the design of (selected) passive systems: 
definitely, all major nuclear accidents have a connection with passive systems).  
All of this may be further synthesized by two statements: 
 Passive systems are part of nuclear technology. 
 Passive systems are seen as inherently protective systems for the complex (whatever complexity, 
whatever unexpected situation) nuclear reactors. 
The former item testifies, among other things, of a wide technical literature. The latter item (also as a 
consequence of the former) may be taken as the visible tip of an iceberg of concerns, hopes, design 
activities and results of research activities connectable with passive systems: namely this is the concern for 
the present paper.  
A universe of findings, situations and opinions actually characterizes passive systems; key-words 
connectable with related components or operation conditions are: accumulator, battery for powering Pilot 
operated Relief Valve (PORV), Isolation condenser (IC) Heat Exchanges (HEX), turbine and pump of Reactor 
Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC), condensation in Pressure Suppression Pool (PSP), natural convection in pools 
and containment open space, gas (noticeably hydrogen) stratification, natural circulation (NC) during Core 
Make-up (CMT) draining, Steam Generator (SG) cooling of the core, condensation on containment wall, 
electrical wire, channel blockage caused by debris, instability in a single boiling channel or in parallel 
channels, quench front progression during reflood, etc. One may also argue that the recently issued list of 
116 thermal-hydraulic phenomena for code validation which are expected to cover Design Basis Accident 
(DBA) conditions in Water Cooled Nuclear Reactors (WCNR), [1], is entirely applicable to passive systems 
with the exception of a couple of phenomena dealing with centrifugal pumps and fans.     
It is understandable that: (a) any generic statement about passive systems may become questionable or 
invalid in each of the applicable situations; (b) fields for passive systems research are in number which 
cannot be easily quantified. Therefore there should be no surprise that a recent effort completed within 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) framework, [2], concludes that ‘clear need to obtain more data’ 
and ‘more practical approach [for the evaluation of reliability of passive systems] would be very helpful’ 
and a new international project has been planned and just started by the Committee on the Safety of 
Nuclear Installations (CSNI) of OECD/NEA, [3]. 
At this point it is clear that one paper may not reasonably cover or even touch all the aspects connected 
with passive systems. Rather the objective here is to issue a Technical Opinion Paper (TOP) in relation to 
the reliability of a passive system. To this aim the first step is to isolate a space from the iceberg of 
knowledge above mentioned. Then insights into the selected topic are summarized which do not 
necessarily reflect the views and the findings available from international activities, e.g. [2] and [3].             
 
2. SCOPE FOR PROVIDING A TECHNICAL OPINION 
Providing a technical opinion in relation to the reliability of passive systems implies considering proper 
constraints to the scope of the activity. A list of assumptions and constraints to limit the field of 
investigation (and of application) is given below including motivations. 
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 The Small Modular Reactors (SMR) are not within the scope although selected derived 
considerations are applicable. The unknown design features and the complexity of a suitable 
reliability analysis constitute the main motivation: in other terms, a suitable reliability analysis is 
expected to provide an answer in relation to acceptability of SMR and that answer cannot be found 
in the present paper where general concepts are discussed (and no analysis is performed). 
  
 The AP-1000 is not included in the present scope because of the large number of passive systems 
interacting among each other adding up to the variety of involved components and thermal-
hydraulic phenomena. Likewise the case of SMR and other reactors not mentioned here, selected 
derived considerations from the paper are applicable. 
 
 The reliability of mechanical electrical and electronic components, like valves, pipes and welding 
unavoidably, Instrumentation and Control (I&C), batteries and wires are not concerned in the TOP: 
main reason is the access to failure databases and the data analysis not performed here.  
 
 The distinction among classes of passive systems, e.g. from IAEA [4], because of the attention here 
focusing on thermal-hydraulics, is irrelevant within the present context. 
 
 The NC phenomena occurring in PWR between Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) and SG and in BWR 
inside the RPV between core and down-comer, [5], are not of main interest here, although 
considered methodological approaches can be utilized in those conditions. The motivation is that 
wide range investigations are performed and related outcomes appear suitable for design and for 
assessing the safety of PWR and BWR. 
 
 Instability in boiling channels which are specific of BWR core region, [6], are not of main interest 
here, although (again) considered methodological approaches can be utilized in those conditions. 
The motivation is that wide range investigations are performed and related outcomes appear 
suitable for design and for assessing the safety of BWR.       
The scope for the present TOP is restricted to the thermal-hydraulic phenomena expected in the system 
sketched in Fig. 1, also called the reference system. The system is characterized by an IC-typical 
configuration and it aims at removing decay power from the core with the heat sink constituted by a pool 
located a few meters away from the core at an upper elevation. One heat exchanger, a surrounding pool, 
inlet and outlet pipes and at least one isolation valve to trigger the operation are part of the system; the 
core with its surrounding RPV is part of the passive system although both the core and the RPV are part of 
the main reactor cooling system; furthermore, not shown in the figure, other valves may be associated with 
the operation of the concerned system like isolation valves installed in steam lines when the IC is used to 
cool the SG or in discharge lines of pressurizer, accumulator or CMT when the PRHR (see below) is used in 
AP-1000. Single and two-phase NC is expected to occur in a boiling condenser mode when two-phase 
conditions are present. The system has applications in PWR (noticeably including AP-1000 where the name 
of the system is Pressurized Residual Heat Removal, PRHR), BWR and SMR where core power constitutes 
the heat source and SG where the heat source is constituted by the primary side of tubes. 
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Items above like NC across the core or instability are part of the thermal-hydraulic phenomena expected for 
the reference system; however, geometries, range of parameters time spans of interest, computational 
capabilities are not necessarily the same as expected in relation to the reference system.  
Key questions to be answered by any reliability study (see next section for the meaning) and specifically 
considered by the present TOP, except question (2), are: 
(1) Is the system better than an equivalent system equipped with (one or more) active components 
like pumps? 
(2) Is the system cheaper than an equivalent active system also in relation to maintenance? 
(3) Is the design of the system optimized (i.e. in relation to distance between heat sink and heat 
source, effective heat transfer area in the heat exchanger, pipe diameter)?  
Restricting to such a narrow range the scope of investigation for the TOP allows conclusions which may be 












Fig. 1 – Reference passive system for the Technical Opinion Paper (TOP). 
 
3. RELIABILITY (OF A SYSTEM) AND UNCERTAINTY (OF A CALCULATION) 
The concepts of reliability and uncertainty are well established in various fields of scientific literature: 
theory of probability and application of computational tools to solve complex problems constitute example 
frameworks, respectively. The focus hereafter is the application of those concepts to the evaluation of 
passive systems: 
 An applicable reliability concept may be easily derived considering the pushing of a switch aimed 
at interrupting the electric current flowing in a wire: if one pushes the switch from its original 
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position (electrical current flowing) 1000 times and he finds that the current does not stop 3 
times, he may conclude that the reliability of the system (i.e. the switch) is 99.7%. 
 An applicable uncertainty concept needs at least identification of thermal-hydraulic phenomena, 
computer code development, validation and use in simulating the performance of a system, 
identification of uncertainty origins and availability of an uncertainty method. The description 
and/or the understanding of the concept cannot be summarized in a few lines: the reader should 
consider reference documents, see e.g. [7].        
It shall be noted that the application of the reliability concept needs a target mission for the system (i.e. the 
interruption of the electric current) and an action to compare the target mission with the actual 
performance of the system. Otherwise, the output of the application of an uncertainty method needs 
suitable qualification and demonstration of usefulness: e.g. if the predicted uncertainty in calculation 
output parameters is very large, it is of little use in practical applications and the knowledge of the 
concerned thermal-hydraulic phenomena may need improvement. 
Now, let’s consider the reference system, i.e. the sketch given in Fig. 1: the objective for the activity is to 
estimate the reliability of the system. At this point we shall introduce the additional constraint that the 
system is not constructed and no related tests or experiments are available. The following minimum list of 
steps to perform the activity of evaluating the reliability of the system is needed: 
1) To fix a Target Mission (TM) for the system: in this case the target mission is the removal of thermal 
power keeping the integrity of the core. 
2) To consider the envelope of situations, i.e. boundary and initial conditions, in relation to which the 
system is called into operation. 
3) To calculate ‘all’ possible situations, and assigning a Probability to each situation / Mission (PM). 
4) To compare calculation results with the target mission.         
Two critical issues may be identified at this point in addition to the issue of identifying ‘all’ possible 
situations: 
A) The target mission for the reliability evaluation is not as simple as in the case of the 
switch used to stop the electrical current. Rather the target mission should be 
connected with thermal-hydraulic phenomena unavoidably implying a transient nature. 
B) The calculation of the target mission implies the use of a computational code and the 
occurrence of uncertainty.    
The cornerstone achievement at this point can be synthesized as follows:  
<we need to calculate the reliability of a thermal-hydraulic phenomenon 
whose evaluation is affected by uncertainty>. 
Apparently we face with an inherent ambiguity: on the one hand the actual (expected, not known) system 
performance (then, the reliability) is not affected by the capability of computational tools (which can be 
quantified by the uncertainty) adopted for the purpose of analyses; on the other hand, any possible 
reliability evaluation is affected by uncertainty.        
In order to solve the ambiguity, already within the first-pioneering proposal of a procedure to evaluate the 
reliability of a passive system, [8], see also [9], the proposal was made to disconnect uncertainty and 
reliability: namely, the reliability is the characteristic of a system and the uncertainty is the characteristic of 
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a calculation. Therefore, the reliability is calculated assuming in a first step, that the code is ‘perfect’ (‘zero’ 
uncertainty) in predicting thermal-hydraulic phenomena expected in the concerned passive system. 
3.1 Insights into TH code application   
The application of thermal-hydraulic system codes within nuclear reactor safety and design constitutes a 
broad topic widely discussed in technical literature, see e.g. [10], also needing to address the scaling issue, 
see e.g. [11]. The following notes supplement and/or justify the assumption of disconnecting the 
uncertainty evaluation from the reliability evaluation when applying a system thermal-hydraulic code to the 
analysis of a passive system. 
The first note deals with parameter ranges. When looking at parameters ranges expected in the operation 
of the concerned passive system, i.e. pressure, temperature, steam and liquid velocity, heat transfer 
coefficient and connected temperature differences, geometry of components including hydraulic 
diameters, etc., the outcome is that the code is qualified within those parameter ranges including their 
combinations. 
The second note deals with prediction errors. The analysis of experimental data involving passive systems 
including experiments performed at full scale (pressure, geometry and exchanged power)  of IC, show 
‘small’ errors (or in-accuracy), or small expected uncertainty bands. The largest contribution to the error is 
expected to be due to pressure drop coefficient (KLOSS) at geometric discontinuities which may not be 
considered an inherent code limitation: rather KLOSS values are supplied by code user and may need specific 
experimental data. The outcome here is that uncertainty in the prediction of passive system performance 
(excluding the part associated with KLOSS) is negligible (see also next section). 
The third note deals with scaling. As a difference from typical phenomena relevant to nuclear reactor 
safety, large scale or even ‘scale 1’ experiments are available for passive systems. This avoids or reduces 
the importance of scaling issue. The outcome strengthens the conclusion at the previous note: the 
uncertainty in the prediction of passive system performance (alone) is negligible.  
The fourth note deals with the reliability and the uncertainty in predicting the behavior of the passive 
system installed within a complex NPP system. Interactions between an assigned passive system and the 
other regions of a nuclear reactor may reveal a source of instabilities, among the other things; this largely 
increases error bands of predictions (i.e. the uncertainty) and directly the reliability. The outcome is that 
even if the reliability of a passive system alone is suitable, a problem (low reliability) may occur when the 
system becomes a part of a more complex system.   
 
4. TECHNICAL OPINION FOR THE CONCERNED PASSIVE SYSTEM  
As an overall result from the previous sections we have that: (a) reliability of a passive system may be 
reduced to the reliability of thermal-hydraulic phenomena expected during the operation of the system, 
and (b) reliability can be distinguished and disconnected from uncertainty when analyses are performed.  
A not-agreed distinction between uncertainty and reliability by the international scientific community is at 
the basis of the present paper; the technical opinion makes use of the diagrams in Figs. 2, 3 and 4. 
Reliability calculation 
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TM = Target Mission




TM =  1.  Mission target  (fully) achieved
PM = 1.   Situation expected for system operation
‘Un-reliability’ region for a passive system
‘Un-reliability’ region for an active system
Note: TM may have the same definition for passive and active systems;        
PM values may refer to different mechanisms
PM*
The Target Mission (TM) and the Probability of Mission (PM) are envisaged quantities to calculate the 
reliability of a passive system. Reliability of NC in the reference passive system is of concern here.  
The calculation of PM requires the identification of the passive system Boundary and Initial Conditions (BIC) 
and the consideration of the Origin of Un-Reliability (OUR). Examples of BIC quantities are the pressure, the 
core power and the distribution of fluid temperature in the system pipelines at the time when the passive 
system operation is triggered. OUR quantities are discussed in section 4.1. Suitable techniques are needed 
to evaluate the probability of an initial status for the passive system operation by combining BIC and OUR, 
see e.g. [12]. 
The calculation of TM implies the knowledge of the system design conditions: in the concerned case the TM 
is expected to be a function of the thermal energy removed from the heat source (i.e. core decay heat) 
during an assigned time period. Several conditions (e.g. mass flow-rate or margin to Departure from 
Nucleate Boiling [DNBR] greater than assigned values for an assigned time period) may be added to form 
the TM. The calculation of TM typically needs a thermal-hydraulic computer code as already mentioned.     
TM and PM may be related in a diagram as in Fig. 2: each open bullet constitutes the outcome of a 
calculation which: (a) is performed starting from one PM value and, (b) results in one TM value. A line 
connecting the open bullets, hereafter called the reliability line, separates reliability and un-reliability 
regions. Looking at the value PM* one may note that different TM values may be associated to a single PM: 
the lowest TM value is used to build-up the reliability line. The system reliability may be assumed as 
connected with the integral of the dotted region above the reliability line: possibly more weight can be 
given to the TM values close to the region PM = 1. 













Fig. 2 – Reliability of the reference passive system and comparison with reliability of an active system 
having the same design mission. 
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Namely, in the horizontal axis in Fig. 2 (see also Figs. 3 and 4) a continuum of event or states is assumed 
with their probability integral equal to 1: for instance, in a BWR it is expected that the IC enters in operation 
when the level of downcomer is within a range A-to-B (where, reasonably, A and B can be 3 and 10 m, 
respectively); furthermore, the power of core in either BWR or PWR could be in a range 0.5% to 4% of 
nominal power (e.g. not 30% core nominal power). 
Finally, when combining PM and TM, consistent weight can be used if one single measure of reliability is 
expected (the word ‘consistent’ implies applicability of the weighting to any comparable system, see also 
below).    
Comparison passive and active systems  
TM and PM values, as well as the reliability line have a recognizable relative meaning, although an effort 
can be made to associate those values and an absolute meaning. Considering the relative meaning, it seems 
essential to compare the calculated reliability of a passive system with, for instance, the reliability of an 
active system having the same mission as the concerned passive system.  This is done in Fig. 2 and the 
dense-dotted area on the left (low probability region) is derived. Within nuclear reactor safety, a passive 
system, other than a lower cost, should show to have a better reliability figure-of-merit than an equivalent 
active system (a gauss-like probability distribution might be considered for active systems, rather than a 
line). A variety of situations may occur in practice, other than one passive system substituting an active 
system, e.g. a) one passive system designed as back-up of an existing active system; b) a reduced quality 
grade active system used as back-up of a passive system, c) two passive systems used instead of one active 
system, d) etc. In each case a specific analysis preliminary probabilistic safety type of analysis may be 
needed before entering into a reliability analysis. Focus is given in the paper to the simplest situation.      
Optimization of the design of a passive system 
The reliability method, generating TM, PM and the reliability line, may be applied to address questions like 
the following ones (see the reference system in Fig. 1, and let’s call system [A] the system which 
corresponds to the reliability line derived in Fig. 2): 
 Is a new system (system [B]) designed with a higher (or lower) elevation of the pool related to the 
core better in terms of reliability than system [A]? 
 Is a new system (system [B]) characterized by two heat exchangers instead of one better than 
system [A]? 
 Is a new system (system [B]) characterized by larger pipe diameter connecting the RPV and the HEX 
better than system [A]? 
 Etc., including combinations of the above.     
The possible answer to (each) one of the questions can be found in Fig. 3: system [B] appears better than 
system [A] if no high weighting of high probability region is adopted; otherwise (high probability region 
highly weighted) system [A] appears better.      
Role of overall system modeling and of uncertainty in the prediction  
The reliability and the uncertainty in predicting the performance of a passive system alone may be different 
when the performance of an overall nuclear reactor system (the NPP) equipped with a passive system is 
dealt with. Key situations are depicted in Fig. 4 where expected impact of uncertainty upon reliability 
prediction is visualized: 
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TM =  1.  Mission target  (fully) achieved
PM = 1.   Situation expected for system operation
‘Un-reliability’ region for passive system [A]
‘Un-reliability’ region for passive system [B]
=  Predicted operational point for passive system [A]














Fig. 3 – Reliability of the reference passive system and comparison with reliability of a modified version of 
the same system. 
 
 The uncertainty in predicting reliability relevant scenarios for the system sketched in Fig. 1, passive 
system alone, moves the reliability line from curve “1” to curve “2” (thin black arrows in Fig. 4):  
vertical arrows represent (small expected) errors associated with the evaluation of TM by a system 
thermal-hydraulics code and horizontal arrows are associated with errors in estimating PM. 
 The outcome of reliability analysis of the passive system embedded into the overall reactor system 
(or the NPP, i.e. with all systems reacting; in other terms the same analysis performed for the 
passive system alone is now repeated with all other systems modeled), may reveal different from 
curve “1”: reliability line “3” may result. 
 The uncertainty in predicting reliability relevant scenarios for an overall NPP which includes the 
system sketched in Fig. 1 moves the reliability line from “1” to “4” in Fig. 4:  vertical arrows 
represent (large expected) errors associated with the evaluation of TM by a system thermal-
hydraulics code; in this case the same horizontal arrows are associated with errors in estimating 
PM (not shown in the diagram).   
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TM =  1. Mission target  (fully) achieved
PM = 1.   Situation expected for system operation
2 = ‘Un-reliability’ line for a 
passive system considering the 
uncertainty - passive system alone
4 = ‘Un-reliability’ line for a passive 






3 = ‘Un-reliability’ line for a passive 















Fig. 4 – Reliability of the reference passive system and impacts of uncertainty of code prediction 
considering the passive system alone and the passive system interacting with other systems in the plant 
[line “1” is the reliability line expected for the passive system alone, see Fig. 2] . 
 
Making reference to Fig. 4, it shall be noted that reliability line “1” is the outcome of a reliability calculation 
where the adopted computational tool is assumed to be without errors (or ‘perfect’). The line “1” is 
expected in case a large number of scale-1 experiments are performed.  
Furthermore, the lines “2” to “4” need the application of computational tools. Namely, the line “2” is 
expected to be close to the line “1” because of suitable validation of current computational tools. The lines 
“3” and “4” imply modeling of the overall system (the NPP): line “3” is the outcome of the analysis when 
reliability origins (passive system alone embedded into the overall system) are considered and line “4” is 
the outcome of the analysis when uncertainty origins (related to the overall system) are considered.     
4.1 Origins of uncertainty and un-reliability 
The origins of uncertainty in thermal-hydraulic code predictions were proposed early in 1998, [13], and 
later on spread in various papers and documents, see e.g. [14]. Namely, the origins of uncertainty are 
connected with imperfect modeling (also called epistemic) and imperfect knowledge of boundary 
conditions (also called aleatory); the latter group providing lower contribution to the overall uncertainty.  
Methods to evaluate the uncertainty are discussed in available literature, see also [7]. 
The reasons or the origins of un-reliability for passive system can be found in papers discussing the 
reliability of passive systems, see e.g. [2], [8], [9], [12], [15] and [16]. Here we shall confirm that the origin 
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of un-reliability shall be connected with the design and the operation characteristics of the (passive) 
systems. As a key difference from the origins of uncertainty, no epistemic or aleatory type of unknowns is 
distinguished; rather, parameter ranges which characterize the design of the (passive) systems are 
involved. Table I has been built In order to clarify the differences between uncertainty and reliability 
quantities, by providing examples of parameters belonging to each of the three classes (columns 3 to 5 
starting from left) ‘reliability of passive system design’, ‘uncertainty of thermal-hydraulic phenomena 
expected in the operation of the passive system alone’ and ‘uncertainty of thermal-hydraulic phenomena 
expected in the operation of the passive system embedded into the nuclear reactor (or the NPP)’. The table 
makes reference to the system in Fig. 1 and to the expected results from reliability and uncertainty studies 
given in Figs. 2 to 4. 
Table I – List of quantities affecting reliability and uncertainty analysis of the reference passive 
system in Fig. 1. 














1 Pressure  X  Aleatory, e.g.  nominal +/- 0.8% 
2 Pressure   X Range*, e.g. 1 – 10 MPa  
3 Core power  X  Aleatory, e.g. nominal +/- 10% 
4 Core power   X Range*, e.g. [0.1-4]% core power  
5 HEX heat transfer coefficient  X   Epistemic, negligible impact 
6 Heat losses IC piping   X Range* 
7 Countercurrent flow in core   X  Epistemic, if occurring 
8 Two phase critical flow  X  Epistemic, if occurring 
9 KLOSS various locations of IC  X   Epistemic 
10 KLOSS various locations of NPP  X  Epistemic 
11 Partial closure of isolation valve   X Not shown in Fig. 1; range* 
12 Partial opening of IC valve   X Shown in Fig. 1; range* 
13 Horizontal pipe inclination   X Range*; irrelevant for active 
systems 14 Non condensable gas in IC pipe   X 
15 Elevation of IC pool    X Alternative passive system design 
optimization, see Fig. 3. 16 No of HEX in the pool   
17 Diameter of IC piping   
(°)Relevant to Fig. 4; (°°) Relevant to Figs. 2 and 3; *to be specified by IC designer; expected for operation of the passive system; 
range split in several regions; each region of the range may correspond to a probability   
 
4.2 Attributes of a reliability study 
A comprehensive reliability study supported by uncertainty analysis is expected to provide methodological 
approaches: 
 to identify a full list of parameters distinguishing into three categories as given in Table I (see 
section 4.1); 
 to characterize the range of variations of parameters (see e.g. [8]); 
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 to identify and to characterize the Target of Mission and the Probability of Mission (TM and PM as 
introduced in Fig. 2), see e.g. [12]; 
 to derive the reliability lines (e.g. as defined in Figs. 2, 3 and 4) and to identify (as far as possible) 
objective values for the system reliability which can compare with the reliability of components of  
equivalent active systems; 
 to allow the comparison between a passive system and an active system having the same Target of 
Mission, see also Fig. 2; 
 to allow the optimization of the design of a passive system, see also Fig. 3;  
 to perform supporting uncertainty studies (as introduced in Fig. 4), see e.g. [7].  
   Results from the reliability study may include diagrams as those in Figs. 2 to 4. 
 
5. CONCLUSIVE REMARKS 
The present Technical Opinion Paper aimed at finding a common understanding among currently debated 
topics dealing with reliability and uncertainty of passive systems. In order to facilitate the objective the 
analysis is focused to one specific system, a NC based system for passive removal of core power in either 
BWR or PWR.    
Three areas for conclusive remarks are identified below.    
A) The Natural Circulation. NC implies the use of gravity force for transferring thermal power from an 
assigned heat source to an assigned heat sink. The driving forces depend upon differences in fluid density 
between a rising side, referred as chimney, and a descending side, referred as downcomer. When water is 
used as acting fluid assuming typical (design detail) elevation differences between source and sink, driving 
head expressed in meters of liquid water at ambient pressure and temperature is of the order of 10-1 and 
100, when single-phase and two-phase conditions are concerned in the system design, respectively. Those 
values should be compared with values of the same quantity in the range 101÷102 when (typically 
centrifugal) pumps are installed in similar loops, called forced circulation (FC) loops, designed to transfer 
the same thermal power from the source to the sink. Noticeably, same thermal power is transferred by NC 
and FC loops with differences in driving forces for two or three orders of magnitude. 
It seems essential that the capabilities of a passive system are compared with the capabilities of an 
equivalent active system having the same design target.  
B)  The distinction between reliability (of a system) and uncertainty (of a calculation). The concepts of 
reliability and uncertainty and the related methods are basically different. First, reliability shall be related 
to a system including its operational conditions, otherwise uncertainty is the attribute of a calculation. 
Second, uncertainty analysis may reveal a key support to an uncertainty study. Namely, the introduction of 
one or more passive systems in any NPP creates new possibilities for the evolution of transient scenarios, 
adding new uncertainties to the evaluation of the overall scenarios in the presence of passive systems. 
It is proposed to perform uncertainty analysis at two levels following a reliability study. The former is 
concerned with the passive system alone and may not bring to substantial changes in the reliability figure. 
The latter is concerned with the entire NPP and may dramatically decrease the reliability of the passive 
system.      
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C) The attributes of a reliability study. Suitable methodologies are needed and should be connected to 
perform a reliability analysis. Design conditions for a passive system should be identified first. Target of 
Mission and Probability of Mission should be defined and shall constitute the objective of calculations. The 
envelope of calculation results may constitute a reliability line and a measure of the objective reliability of 
the concerned passive system. Reliability of a passive system alone may be different from reliability of the 
same system (with the same mission) as part of a complex system (e.g. the nuclear reactor). Uncertainty 
analysis is needed to support reliability evaluation.   
The key conclusions are:  
- a reliability analysis may reveal necessary to demonstrate the effectiveness of a passive system and to 
optimize its design;  
- reliability studies supported by uncertainty evaluation may show that passive systems alone are not 
protecting the core of nuclear reactors in each foreseeable accident condition; furthermore, based on a 
successful reliability analysis, the suitability of an optimized passive system added to an existing set of 
active systems  may be justified;  
- as a side consequence of the reliability study, e.g. the identification of reliability parameters, specific 
licensing rules are needed for approving the operation of passive systems; 
- the reliability of operation of a passive system, once a target mission is assigned, may reveal not unitary; 
- justification of large power nuclear reactors (NPP) protected only by passive systems may require large 
efforts and resources. 
The outcomes of the paper or, better, the results of reliability analyses possibly based on the 
considerations in the paper, are applicable to any passive system, noticeably including SMR and AP-1000. 
However, results shall focus upon individual systems in relation to which design details are known and 
reliability analysis is performed. This is not the case of either AP-1000 or any SMR: therefore no conclusion 
can be drawn in relation to those systems.  
Furthermore, the impact upon safety evaluation and licensing of any reliability study should distinguish the 
situation where a passive system is used as a substitute of an active system from the situation where a 
passive system is used to attribute a diverse redundancy to an active system. In the latter case, i.e. 
combination active and passive system, a reliability study may be performed to optimize the overall system, 
eventually proving that this is the optimal solution.  
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